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Abstract 
As part of the implementer of judicial power, the attorney must also obtain a guarantee of independence in 
exercising its duties and functions. Without an independent attorney, it is impossible for an independent judicial 
authority to be realized. This research is descriptive with normative-juridical type. The approaches used were 
statutory, conceptual, analytical and case, and comparative by using deductive and inductive reasoning. The results 
show that implementing the attorney’s independence must be realized in the form of an independence guarantee 
for the executing apparatus (prosecutor and attorney general) in exercising law enforcement duties. It is not in the 
form of institution independence as happened during the guided democracy up to now. The establishment of the 
attorney as an independent institution apparently is not directly proportional to the independence in the 
implementation of duties and functions in the field of law enforcement that is right under the authority of the 
President. When the independence of the attorney is implemented in the form of individual independence of the 
prosecutors and the Attorney General, it brings positive implications for the implementation of law enforcement 
duties. 
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1. Introduction 
A main instrument of the constitutional State is the guarantee of the implementation of an independent 
judiciary and free from other powers in order to enforce a fair legal process to all citizens.1 In essence, the 
power is not only exercised by the judiciary that refer to the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court but 
also by other bodies, one of them is attorney. As part of the implementer of judicial power, the attorney must 
also obtain a guarantee of independence in exercising its duties and functions. Without an independent 
attorney, it is impossible for an independent judicial authority to be realized. Without an independent judicial 
power, it is impossible for the legal supremacy to be realized. In other words, an independent attorney also 
contributes to the realization of the legal supremacy which has a strong influence on the realization of 
democratic statehood. By the good legal supremacy, it is expected to be able to support the creation of a 
democratic political process so that it can produce professional leaders with integrity. In addition, a good 
legal supremacy is ultimately expected to bring about justice, legal certainty, and benefits for society. 
The independence of the attorney in implementing law enforcement has actually been regulated in Article 2 
paragraph (2) of Act No. 16 of 2004 concerning the Attorney of the Republic of Indonesia. In a quo article 
states that State authority in the field of prosecution is exercised independently. It means to be free from the 
influence of government and other powers. However, this is often doubted by the public, because of the 
position of the Attorney General as the President’s Assistant who can be dismissed at any time by the 
President. The position of the Attorney General as the President’s Assistant has been going on since President 
Soekarno applied the concept of integrated democracy and rejected the trias politica by making all State 
officials including the Attorney General as a Minister that basically as the President’s Assistant. After the 
Attorney General is appointed as minister, the attorney is excluded from the Department of Justice and stands 
 
1 Independent judicial power as a main instrument of the constitutional State was stated by Van der Pot Donner who 
represented the experts from the civil law system. See Marwan Effendy, Kejaksaan RI: Posisi dan Fungsinya dari Perspektif 
Hukum, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2005, p. 23. While, a fair legal process as one of the important elements of the 
constitutional State was put forward by Albert Venn Dicey who represented the experts of the common law system. See Jimly 
Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi & Konstitusionalisme Indonesia, Jakarta: Konstitusi Pres, 2005, p. 152 
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alone as the Department of Attorney or non-departmental institution. 
Actually, the independence of the institution was not followed by the independence of the implementing 
apparatus because as minister or President’s assistant, the Attorney General can be dismissed at any time by 
the President. The history of law-enforcement in Indonesia shows that since the Attorney General was 
appointed as Minister or President’s Assistant, the independence of the attorney was weak and law 
enforcement has not proceeded professionally. Historically, the decline of law enforcement in Indonesia by 
the attorney was in line with the discontinuance of Attorney General Soeprapto and the shift of the attorney 
to the court authority.1 At the time, the leadership of the attorney began from politicians and the military, and 
the attorney was under executive and military control. According to Gunawan Muhamad, the most dilapidated 
in the history of modern Indonesia over the past 30-40 years is the breakdown of the law. During the guided 
democracy, the law was defeated by revolutionary politics. Revolution is put above all, and law is not 
considered as important thing. Judges can be bribed and lawyers become brokers for bribes.2 Such law 
enforcement apparently has not stopped after the new order was replaced by the reform order and now it 
should be elaborated more deeply related to the independence of the attorney institution. This research is 
descriptive with normative-juridical type. The approaches used were statutory, conceptual, analytical and 
case, and comparative by using deductive and inductive reasoning. 
 
2. The Challenges of Attorney’s Independence: Comparative Study 
Literally, independent means not subject to the power or influence of other parties. In the Black’s Law 
Dictionary, independent means “not subject to control or influence of another.”3 In order not to submit to the 
power or influence of other parties, it must have the power to resist intervention from other parties. Without 
having the power to resist, it is impossible for someone to maintain their independence. According to Artidjo 
Alkostar, independence contains 2 (two) meanings, namely institutional and functional independences. 
Institutional independence means an independent institution and must be free from intervention by another 
outside the system. While, functional independence is independence in exercising their duties and functions.4 
A similar opinion was expressed by David Phillip Jones who stated that independence could involve 
individuals or institutions in relation to status or relations with another. 5  Therefore, independence 
encompasses independence or individual or institutional freedom against the influence of external parties. 
The issue of independence has a very significant role in realizing free and impartial judicial authority. This 
is not only a matter for judges but also concerns prosecutors, because both are executors of judicial authority. 
Even in France, prosecutors and judges are classified in one level, namely the magistrate. Without an 
independent prosecutor, it is impossible for a judge to exercise his duties and functions independently. It 
because the criminal case examined by the judge is very dependent on the prejudgment made by the 
prosecutor. Thus, the prosecutor also needs to guarantee his independence in exercising his duties and 
functions.  
In fact, the matter of the prosecutor’s independence has been a serious discussion at various meetings of 
European countries, including The European Status of Justice 1993. The meeting encourages discussions 
about the prosecution system in the State authority structure. Section 9.1 the Resolution of the European 
Status of Justice asserts “self-government in prosecution creates an essential instrument of judicial power 
independence”. Thus, the ability to decide independently in a prosecution body is an essential instrument in 
 
1 Daniel S. Lev, Hukum dan Politik di Indonesia, (Translated: Nirwono and A.E. Priyono), Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990, p. 203. 
2 Goenawan Mohamad (ed), “Menyalahkan Lilin Dalam Kegelapan”, Jakarta: ISAI, 1999, pp. 214-215. 
3 Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, ST. Paul: West Group, 2009, p. 838 
4 Artidjo Alkostar, “Menjaga Keselarasan antara Moral dan Hukum; Reformasi Peradilan di Indonesia.” A Paper of National 
Seminar ‘Dialectics Between Law and Moral; A Lesson of Legal Reform in Reform Era, in the 68th  Anniversary of the Islamic 
University of Indonesia on April 29, 2011 at Auditorium Kahar Mudzakkir, Islamic University of Indonesia, Yogyakarta, 2011, 
pp. 7-8. 
5 David Phillip Jones, “Recent Developments in Independence and Impartiality,” Canadian Journal of Administrative Law 
& Practice, 2002, Accessed on http://www.westlaw.com, 08 Nopember 2019. 
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realizing independent judicial power. However, the implementation of the attorney’s independence in each 
country is realized differently. In outline, it is usually realized in the form of appointment procedures; 
dismissal; and the term of the Attorney General; and the organizational structure of the attorney. 
In the United States (Anglo America), the independence of the prosecution is implemented through the 
procedure for selecting prosecutors through the General Elections. The State prosecutor (District Attorney) 
is elected directly by the people of the State, while the federal prosecutor (US’s Attorney) is elected by 
senators in the congress. This shows the prosecutors in the United States are political positions, therefore the 
position of prosecutors in the United States is very strong. As a political figure, a prosecutor must be able to 
maintain their integrity and professionalism so that their electability is maintained in the eyes of the public. 
Not infrequently then they are elected to become Governor, or even become President like Bill Clinton, who 
was the Governor and Attorney General in the State (Arkansas).1 The independence of the prosecution in the 
United State is also supported by a private prosecutor system. The injured party can appoint a private party 
to conduct investigation and prosecution if they are unsure of the performance of the State prosecutor. This 
system can encourage prosecutors to act professionally because there are “comparative prosecutors” serve as 
a means of social control for the public to oversee the duties of State’s prosecutors. 
In Malaysia (Anglo Saxon), the State’s Peguan (Attorney General) was appointed by “Yang di-Pertuan Agong” 
as proposed by the Prime Minister. Those who can be appointed as State’s Peguan are who eligible to become 
judges of the Supreme Court (MA).2 He holds position for as long as is permitted by Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
and cannot be dismissed, unless there is a good reason. The procedure for dismissal of the Attorney General 
is the same as the Supreme Court judge.3 According to Mohomad Sophian, prosecutor at the position of 
Peguan Negara Kuala Lumpur – Malaysia’s Attorney General was directly under the Prime Minister, but the 
one who appointed him was not the Prime Minister but Yang Di-Pertuan Agung (the King) as proposed by 
the Prime Minister. After being appointed, they cannot be dismissed at any time until retirement age (60 
years). Dismissal and substitution of the Attorney General before retirement age may only be done through 
a tribunal examination by the Supreme Court. Without the decision of the Tribunal, anyone cannot dismiss 
the Attorney General.4 
In the Netherlands (Continental Law), the Attorney General is appointed for life as a judge (Supreme), 
although it is also possible that the law determines a certain age limit.5 According to R. Tresna that the reason 
the Attorney General was appointed for life is because it is not impossible that at one time he had to act 
against the Minister of Justice (who is the direct superior of the Attorney General). In addition, do not let the 
Attorney General be dismissed for reasons of opportunity or political considerations. In the interest of the 
State, the position of the Attorney General must not be paralyzed, if at any time he must carry out his 
obligations by taking action against those who are in power.6 
 
3. Implications of Attorney Independence 
In relation with two forms of implementation of the prosecutors’ “independence”, Andi Hamzah distinguishes 
between independent and stand alone. Standalone means institutionally the attorney is separate from other 
institutions so that it stands alone as an institution as is currently happening in Indonesia. While, independent 
means that the prosecutor is autonomous in implementing his duties and functions, free from the influence 
of other powers and leaders, there is no exposure before the trial and there is no “harmonious”. Prosecutors 
are considered as doctors who practice based on their profession.7 This means that the independence is in the 
 
1 R.M. Surachman, Mozaik Hukum I 30 Bahasan Terpilih, Jakarta: CV. Sumber Ilmu Jaya, 1996, pp. 88-89. 
2 Article 145 paragraph (1) the Malaysian Constitution. 
3 Article 145 paragraph (5) and (6) the Malaysian Constitution. 
4 Interview with Mohamad Sophian on 13 March 2017 in Denpasar. 
5 Article 167 paragraph (2) Grondwet Belanda. See Andi Hamzah, Op. Cit., p. 66. 
6 R. Tresna, Loc. Cit. 
7 Andi Hamzah, “Posisi Kejaksaan dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan RI”, National Symposium “Hari Bhakti Adhyaksa”. Held 
by Pusat Litbang Kejaksaan Agung. Jakarta: 20 July 2000, p. 3. 
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“person” and not the institution. The author agrees that independence must be aimed at the implementation 
of law enforcement tasks, not institutional independence. The prosecutor’ office may not be independent 
because it is part of the executive bodies, but in implementing its law enforcement duties it must be 
independent because it is part of the judicial authority. 
The reluctance of the Presidents to exclude the Attorney General from the cabinet arrangement because it 
was comfortable using the prosecutor hands as a bat.1 The shift in attorney independence has implications 
for many aspects. The important aspects that changed due to the influence of the shift include the 
organizational structure of the prosecutor’s office, the individual autonomy of prosecutor and the 
independence of the prosecutor in implementing law enforcement duties. 
The independence of the attorney and the shift of the attorney to the realm of the pure executive, also affect 
the loss of individual autonomy of attorney. Whereas, individual autonomy as a characteristic of the apparatus 
implementing judicial authority. Even the bureaucracy of attorney has not only shifted to the bureaucratic 
system of the civilian executive body but has led to the semi-military, which is marked by the emergence of 
a unity of command system. Before guided democracy, the Attorney General was indeed the supreme leader 
of the attorney. However, because all prosecutors are functional, there is no unity of command from the 
Attorney General to the High Prosecutor and Head of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in handling case-by-
case cases. The Attorney General only issues a prosecution policy that must be carried out and guided by all 
prosecutors. When it is included in the technical and material matters, the Attorney General may not even 
intervene. 
To maintain the unity of the policy in the field of prosecution so that it can display the characteristics that are 
united in the mindset, code of conduct, and work procedures of the attorney.2 Thus, the prosecution in court 
by the attorney will not stop just because the prosecutor who was originally in charge of obstruction. 
Prosecution by the prosecution will continue even if it is exercised by other prosecutors as a substitute. By 
this principle, prosecutors are bound by one relation and work together for a common goal. The actions of 
one prosecutor also bind the other prosecutors.3 So it is not right, if this principle is interpreted as a unity of 
command that castrates the independence of prosecutors. 
Soemantri said that the system is a group of parts that work together to do a purpose. If one part, then the 
system will not function as it should.4 This was also stated by Mardjono Reksodiputro regarding the problem 
of the criminal justice system. According to him the criminal justice system is run by several elements which 
mutually influence one another. Weakness of one element will affect the other elements. He took the example 
of interrelated-vessel: “a point of ink in the water of one vessel, slowly but surely will muddy the water of all 
vessels.”5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The interrelated-vessel theory in the criminal justice system 
 
The attorney with a uniform and a command system was adopted by the communist countries. In Indonesia, 
 
1 Andi Hamzah, Perbandingan Pemberantasan Korupsi di Berbagai Negara, Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2005, pp. 7-8. 
2 Elucidation Article 2 paragraph (1) Act No. 16 of 2004 concerns the Attorney of the Republic of Indonesia. 
3 M.H. Tirtaamidjaja, Kedudukan Hakim dan Djaksa dalam Atjara Pemeriksaan Perkara-Perkara Pidana dan Perdata, 
Jakarta: Djambatan,1990., pp. 6-7. 
4 https://informasiana.com/10-pengertian-sistem-menurut-para-ahli/, Accessed on 24 July 2019. 
5 Mardjono Reksodiputro. Kriminologi dan Sistem Peradilan Pidana. Jakarta: Pusat Pelayanan Keadilan dan Pengabdian 
Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 1997. 
Attorney Prosecutor Judge Correctional 
Inst. 
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this “may” mixed with the desire of the military in the New Order era to take an active role in various sectors 
of national life. This causes the principle of “attorney one and inseparable”, to be understood as “unity of 
responsibility” within the framework of unity of command. This means that the leader must participate in 
making decisions because he must share responsibility for what his subordinates do. In spite of the 
ineffectiveness of harmonious institutions in preventing disparity in pursuit, what is clear is this is not in line 
with the position of the prosecutor as the executor of the judicial power which must be independent. Because 
such pattern, according to Andi Hamzah, opens up opportunities for superior intervention. 
 
4. An Ideal Model of Prosecutor Independence 
Currently, the independence model of attorney Indonesia is institution independence; it causes the law 
enforcement in Indonesia by the attorney is less professional. Even among the public appear perceptions, the 
attorney is easy to use by authorities as a bat against political opponents and vice versa as a protector of his 
cronies. It is not in line with the philosophy of a democratic rule of law. For this reason, there needs to be a 
renewal of the independence model of attorney in order to be able to implement law enforcement that is fair, 
certain and useful. Independent law enforcement will have an impact on various aspects of social life, both 
in terms of political, economic, social and so forth so that it will be able to realize a safe, peaceful, orderly, 
just and prosperous society (tata tentrem kerta raharja). 
The ambiguity of the position of attorney in the constitutional structure that exists at the two legs of 
authorities requires very serious attention because with such a position, the attorney also has a double 
obligation. On the attorney side, they must implement law enforcement policies set by the government 
(executive), so that they are subject to instructions issued by the government. But on the other hand, the 
attorney exercises the duty of law enforcement independently as part of judicial authority. During this, such 
double duties raises doubts among the public about the objectivity of the attorney in making important 
decisions related to handling cases involving the interests of the authorities or the government. This problem 
becomes more complicated if it turns out that the authorities or governments also do not really have a 
commitment to uphold the rule of law. Public pessimism in relation with the objectivity of attorney in 
handling cases, especially when it comes to the interests of the authorities. It triggers the issuance of the idea 
to position the prosecutor as an independent State agency, not to become a government institution under the 
executive and other powers. 
The idea is not quite right because the law enforcement process is essentially inseparable from the politics of 
law issued by the government in order to create a society that is safe, peaceful, orderly, peaceful, just, and 
prosperous (tentrem kerta raharja), so the government must have the tools to enforce the law, one of which 
is the attorney. Moreover, the responsibility of law enforcement politically lies with the government. The 
right way to overcome this problem is by providing a constitutional guarantee for the attorney in the 
constitutional structure and guarantee for the term of office of the Attorney General. A factor causing 
polemics about the independence and position of the attorney in the constitutional structure is due to the 
unclear regulation in the 1945 Constitution. Whereas many other State constitutions in the world have 
included prosecutors as material for the contents of the State constitution. 
As reviewed by Blaustin and Lanz in the National University of Singapore (NUS) Library in the form of 20 
(twenty) compilation volumes, out of 192 (one hundred ninety two) constitutions studied, as many 113 (one 
hundred thirteen) constitutions (93 independent State constitution and 20 autonomous regions constitutions) 
which explicitly regulate the position of the attorney and/or the Attorney General. This number could increase, 
considering that Yusril Ihza Mahendra once revealed that there are 146 the constitution that contains 
provisions concerning the Attorney General. Moreover, the results of the study at the NUS Library are only 
temporary (not the final result) because it could be that the constitutions that have been reviewed have already 
been subjected to amendments that are not yet known by the reviewers.1 In addition, the Attorney General 
 
1 RM. Surachman and Jan S. Maringka, Op. Cit. p. 113 et seq 
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and the Attorney are included in the 1945 Constitution as a fact that the attorney is an institution that does 
not include 35 (thirty-five) institutional subjects and positions that are expressly regulated and mentioned in 
the 1945 Constitution. 
Facts as mentioned above raises the question of how far the State considers the existence of the attorney in 
exercise the law enforcement function in Indonesia, compared to the functions of other institutions listed in 
the 1945 Constitution. Another question is whether the prosecution function carried out by the attorney is 
less important when compared to the two other sub-justice systems, namely the police and the court. Whereas, 
if reviewed from the position of the attorney in trias politica, actually the constitutional protection for the 
attorney independence (prosecutor) is necessary to get attention more compared the protection of the 
independence of the court (judge). This is because as part of the jurisdiction of justice an sich, there is no 
longer any doubt that the judge and the judiciary must indeed be independent. Therefore, interference in the 
performance of the duties of the judges will definitely get strict opposition from the experts. In addition, with 
only one power in place, the intervention of other powers can easily be denied. But this is not the case with 
the attorney, because as an institution that is under two legs of authorities that has different characteristics, 
the intervention of the executive institution cannot be avoided because the nature of the executive institution 
does indeed have a hierarchy and command. Therefore, protection of the attorney independence needs to get 
more serious attention. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Implementation of the attorney’s independence must be realized in the form of an independence guarantee 
for the executing apparatus (prosecutor and attorney general) in exercising law enforcement duties. It is not 
in the form of institution independence as happened during the guided democracy up to now. The 
establishment of the attorney as an independent institution apparently is not directly proportional to the 
independence in the implementation of duties and functions in the field of law enforcement that is right under 
the authority of the President. When the independence of the attorney is implemented in the form of individual 
independence of the prosecutors and the Attorney General, it brings positive implications for the 
implementation of law enforcement duties. 
A model of ideal attorney independence is individual independence of apparatuses, especially the Attorney 
General, it because as a representative institution, if the prosecutors and the Attorney General have individual 
autonomy so that they can exercise their duties independently, it will also lead to the perception that the 
attorney has independence in implement law enforcement. However, if the independence is given to the 
institution, it is not certain that the attorney apparatus has independence because the authority in an institution 
is the leader, so that leaders can intervene in their subordinates. As the executing of judicial power, the 
independence must be granted to prosecutors individually, but the prosecutors must subject to the policy 
directives as outlined by the leader because the attorney is also within the scope of executive authority. 
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